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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
Excess capacity in fisheries and over-exploitation of fish resources is associated with 
reduced food production potential and economic waste (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2008a). 
The race to expand harvesting of wild fish exemplifies the tragedy of the commons and has long been 
a subject for research in resource economics (i.e., Gordon, 1954). Management of this common-pool 
resource remains difficult, however, leading to a declining volume of fish caught for developed 
countries from 1979 through 2005 (FAO, 2008b).  
Fisheries in Japan, as in many other countries, are both biologically and economically 
overexploited (Pascoe et al., 2004). Japanese fishery catches have been decreasing over the last two 
decades. For example, catches in 2006 totaled about 55,000 metric tons (Fig. 1), which is only 44% 
of 1987 production (FAO, 2008b). The number of vessels and fishermen has also been diminishing to 
a 2006 level of 210,246 and 212,470 vessels and fishermen, respectively, down from 308,335 and 
411,040 in 1987 (MAFF, 2007). The exit of fishermen has kept labor productivity (i.e., the quantity of 
fish caught per worker) and capital productivity (i.e., value per fishing vessel) relatively stable for all 
fish excluding sardines, with a maximum fluctuation of 20%.  
Takarada and Managi (2010) describe a negative spiral of overexploitation in the Japanese 
fishing industry, with a race for fish among fishermen who invest in new capacity to capture as much 
of the remaining fish stocks as possible. As the fish stock decreased in the late 1980s, these individuals’ 
profits began to diminish. In response, an additional increase in the fishing effort occurred in an 
attempt to recover previous economic losses. Then, the fish stocks kept decreasing due to further 
fishing efforts, and the fishermen faced the need to increase their efforts or exit the industry. As a result, 
the Japanese fishing industry has been shrinking for decades as a market. In fact, the number of the 
coastal fishing boats and the production numbers for coastal fisheries are decreasing continuously 
(MAFF, 2005a).  
To stop the downward spiral associated with overuse of an open-access resource, fishery 
policies in Japan include the total allowable catch (TAC) and total allowable effort (TAE) systems, 
national and prefectural government licensing systems, and a large amount of government financial 
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transfers (GFTs). The TAC is a catch limit set for a particular fishery, generally for a year or a fishing 
season and is usually expressed in tonnages of live-weight equivalent but is sometimes set in terms of 
numbers of fish (OECD, 1998). The TAE sets an upper limit on the number of fishing days and the 
number of operating vessels in a specific area within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).1 
For the purpose of resource management, however, these fishery policies need to be further 
examined. The fisheries in Japan remain open access resources because their TAC caps have been too 
loose to restrict the activity of fishermen. In most cases, until 2009 in Japan, the TAC caps were higher 
than the allowable biological catch (ABC) figures, which indicate the level of stock that accounts for 
the scientific uncertainty in the estimate of overfishing limit. In addition, financial support seems to 
merely maintain capacity at a stable level rather than attempting to control fishery capacity.  
In this article, we analyze the profit potential in Japan’s fishery industry that would follow 
from the allocation of optimal, individually specific catch limits. Keeping in mind the importance of 
fishery management and production in Japan, this study analyzes the quantitative potential of optimal 
input/output allocation by assigning optimal individual quotas (IQs). Our results show the ideal case 
for the potential IQ system in one respect. The catch shares of the IQ system divide the total permitted 
catch in a fishery into shares (Macinko and Bromley, 2002). That is, under these systems, yearly limits 
or quotas are set for a fishery.2 This ensures that, given the scientifically allowable total catch, a 
percentage share of that total can be allocated to fishermen based on the level of calculated optimal 
output for each region/fisherman. 
 
1 In consideration of the declining fish catches, the Japan Fisheries Agency enacted the “Basic Law 
on Fisheries Policy” in June 2001. The law presents new guidelines for fishery policy, replacing the 
“Coastal Fishery and Others Promotion Law” of 1963, whose primary aim was to improve fishery 
productivity. The Basic Law includes two key concepts: (1) securing a stable supply of fishery 
products and (2) the sound development of the fisheries industry to promote the appropriate 
conservation and management of marine life resources.  
2 The allocated shares are bought and sold like shares of stock in a company. Shareholders in the 
fishery are each guaranteed a percentage of the catch. The number of fish that each fisherman may 
catch is usually based on past averages. The catch share systems are already common in Australia, 
New Zealand, and Iceland, while they have been gaining popularity in Canada and the United States. 
Though our model directly shows how much each individual needs to catch (and use as effort), we do 
not make a market mechanism a part of the model. In this sense, it is different from the catch shares 
concept. However, we are able to show optimal individual catch combinations so that total catch is 
divided into catch shares. 
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The more in-depth purpose of this study is to measure the fishing capacity of Japan’s 
fisheries. Then, we examine how much cost reduction they can achieve in a well-controlled world 
using unique disaggregated data covering all areas of Japan. We also aim to determine the optimal 
inputs/outputs mix of Japanese fisheries given fishery quotas. It is also important to recognize how 
much capacity will be necessary when the TAC system, which is apparently too loose at present, 
tightens up as individual transferable quotas (ITQs). This offers criteria for stringent quota 
enforcement. In addition, we consider technical inefficiencies due to differences in fishery areas and 
fishing types under different conditions and variant distributions of fish stocks. 
Previous research has often aimed to measure the degree of excess capacity among fishing 
fleets, in terms of capacity output and capacity utilization (CU). Fishing capacity is the maximum 
amount of fish over a period of time (a year or season) that can be produced by a fishing fleet if fully 
utilized, given the biomass and age structure of the fish stock and the present state of the technology, 
whereas capacity output represents the maximum level of production that the fixed inputs are capable 
of supporting under normal working conditions (see FAO, 2003, 2008a; Färe et al., 1994; Johansen, 
1968; Kirkley et al., 2003; Morrison, 1985). CU is the proportion of available capacity that is utilized 
and is usually defined as the ratio of actual (i.e., current) output to some measure of capacity (i.e., 
potential) output (see Kirkley et al., 2003; FAO, 2003, 2008a; Morrison, 1985; Nelson, 1989). 
Therefore, CU is measured on a 0 to 1 scale. When CU is less than 1, one could produce a better catch 
than the current catch if inputs were fully utilized. In other words, smaller inputs are sufficient 
(assuming they are fully utilized) to produce a catch of the current size. 
In this study, we use the revised Johansen industry model to measure capacity outputs 
following Kerstens et al. (2006). This model uses two steps involving different linear programming 
(LP) techniques. First, we measure the capacity output by using output-oriented data envelopment 
analysis (DEA). Then, we measure the optimal fixed inputs given in certain fishery quotas. Optimal 
scales for outputs and fixed factor inputs indicate the required total outputs and inputs at the industry 
level. The calculated loss of efficiency shows the possible reduction in the fixed inputs. The capacity 
outputs assume variable return to scale (VRS) in our model to be flexible. The production frontier is 
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calculated based on the maximum outputs given current inputs.  
The data used in this study come from the 11th Fishery Census of Japan of 2003 and the 
Annual Statistics on Fishery and Fish Culture 2003 by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries of Japan. The data sets include each aggregated fishery entity in each municipality and for 
each marine fishery type in the whole of Japan, and they contain a wealth of data at the whole industrial 
level. Note it is not clear how much of the fleet has changed since 2003. Furthermore, the census data 
do not include individual data per vessel. Capacity output and CU in this study are estimated not per 
vessel as defined in previous studies but instead per municipality per marine fishery type. Our 
estimation method could be applied to other data, however, and is provided as a MATLAB program 
together with the Japanese data alongside the online version of this article at the publisher’s website. 
 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Policies in Japan 
In 1995, the Japan Fisheries Agency started to reduce the number of fishing vessels and 
restrictions on fishing area and/or period for some fisheries to ensure the sustainable use of fishery 
resources. The TAC system has also been implemented. The principal laws are “The Fisheries Law,” 
the “Living Aquatic Resources Protection Law,” and the “Law Concerning the Conservation and 
Management of Marine Living Resources.” These principal laws were also amended in keeping with 
the concept of the “Basic Law on Fisheries Policy.” The central and prefectural governments regulate 
fishing efforts in terms of fishing methods. The TAC system assigns TAC allocations to each fishery 
separately but not to individual fishermen. While seven fish species are subject to the TAC system, 
covering about 30% of total fishing in Japan in 2000, the TAE was established as a system for 
managing total allowable effort with the amendment of the “Law Concerning Conservation and 
Management of Marine Living Resources.” The TAE includes curtailing the number of boats, the 
suspension of operations, and the improvement of fishing gear, among others. However, these 
regulations are not effective, and the catch has been decreasing continuously. Essentially, the 
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regulations are too loose to control the actual activities of fishermen.  
Meanwhile, the amount of GFTs related to fisheries in Japan (JPY 271 billion in 2003), 
which tends to decline slightly over the past 10 years, is much larger than in most OECD countries 
(OECD, 2006). The largest portion of GFTs related to fisheries in Japan is allocated to the construction 
of coastal infrastructure (JPY 203 billion in 2003), i.e., fishing ports and other coastal public facilities, 
among others. The other forms of financial support provided by Japan to the fishing industry are direct 
payments for fishery restructuring (JPY 2 billion in 2003), interest subsidies (JPY 3 billion in 2003), 
which are designed to facilitate the structural adjustment of coastal fisheries under certain conditions, 
and general services expenditures (JPY 62 billion in 2003; OECD, 2006). The amounts of GFTs 
providing direct payments for restructuring and interest subsidies are much lower than those for the 
others. These subsidies apparently are justified because they do not contribute to the increase in fishing 
capacity.  
 
2.2. Review of methodologies 
There have been many studies that have focused on fishing capacity and measured capacity 
output and CU for decades. The assessment methods for estimating CU can be roughly classified into 
two groups: parametric methods and nonparametric methods. In one example of the use of parametric 
methods, Kirkley and Squires (1988) introduce a hedonic cost function approach to estimating the 
aggregate capital stock and investment in a fishery utilizing limited information. They use vessel 
acquisition price and vessel characteristics in New England from 1965 to 1981. Although these data 
have several limitations, the results indicate that the investment in New England fisheries appears to 
have increased over time. The largest increase in investment occurred in 1979, after the passage of the 
Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976.  
Similarly, Asche et al. (2008) adopt a parametric approach that includes cost and profit 
functions, with survey data for costs and earnings. They investigate potential rents and overcapacity 
in five case studies in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the U.K. (countries that use individual vessel 
quota systems), and in Iceland (a nation that uses the individual transferable quota (ITQ) system). 
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Based on their cost and earnings data, the actual level of economic profits earned by these fisheries, 
with the exception of Iceland, was found to be negligible. However, the results show that more than 
half of the vessels were potentially redundant, and potential economic profits were estimated to be 
between 22% and 61% of revenue in all case studies. 
In another case using parametric approaches, Felthoven and Morrison Paul (2004) develop 
a multi-output and multi-input stochastic function framework considering changing output 
compositions at full capacity to estimate capacity output and CU. They use the model to analyze 
catcher-processor vessels in the Alaskan pollock fishery. The average capacity utilization measure in 
2001 ranges from 0.65 for a scenario with the flatfish catch held constant to 1.1 for a scenario assuming 
unrestricted output composition. The former implies that the pollock catch could increase by about 
53% on average with the same level of flatfish landings. The latter suggests that economic optimization 
over outputs will result in less pollock being caught. The authors also find that for many vessels, there 
is a divergence between the output price ratio of pollock to flatfish and the marginal rate of 
transformation (i.e., output trade-offs).  
In addition, there are also many studies using nonparametric approaches, usually the DEA 
approach, to estimate capacity output and CU. Tingley and Pascoe (2005a) estimated the CU of four 
U.K. fleet segments using the DEA model following Färe et al. (1989, 1994) and examined some 
factors affecting CU via tobit regression analysis. The results indicate that the average CU of otter 
trawling vessels, beam trawling vessels, scallop dredging vessels, and gill netting vessels in U.K. 
fisheries are 0.88, 0.67, 0.78, and 0.70, respectively, and show that they could increase their outputs 
by 14%, 50%+, 28%, and 43%. The results of the tobit analysis suggest that changes in stock 
abundance are the main factor affecting CU, although the overall statistical quality of the models was 
poor.  
Based on Färe et al. (2001), Kerstens et al. (2006) have developed a sophisticated variation 
on the multi-output/input frontier-based short-run Johansen industry model. In the industry model, the 
capacity of individual fishery entities is utilized by minimizing fixed industry inputs given their total 
outputs, their capacities, and the current state of the technology and assuming that the variable inputs 
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are allowed to vary and be fully utilized. The authors use the industry model to analyze the capacity 
outputs of the Danish fleets, analyzing scenarios including tightening quotas, seasonal closure policies, 
lower and upper bounds, decommissioning schemes, and area closures. The results show that vessel 
numbers can be reduced by about 14% and the use of fixed inputs by around 15%, depending on the 
specific objective and the policy mix at a specific Danish fishery. Tingley and Pascoe (2005b) uses an 
industry adjustment model which is in line with Kerstens et al (2006) to find the effects of introducing 
ITQs on fleet structure and profitability. 
 
 
3. Model 
3.1. Industry model 
Following the revised short-run Johansen model by Kerstens et al. (2006), we compute 
marine fishery efficiencies in Japan. The conceptual model proceeds via two steps. In the first step, 
the capacity measures are compared to determine capacity production for each fishery entity at the 
production frontier. Capacity production is calculated using the output-oriented DEA model assuming 
strong disposal of inputs and outputs and VRS (see Managi et al. (2004) for intuitive explanation of 
the DEA). In the second step, individual entity capacities are utilized and fixed industry inputs are 
minimized given total outputs, capacities, and the current state of the technology. This capacity 
measure is short-run because it does not assume any change in existing firm-level capacity and because 
it is a technical rather than an economic capacity notion. Another reason is that it also assumes constant 
stocks.  
The following models are used in this study. The production technology S transforms inputs 𝑥 = (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛) ∈ 𝑅+𝑛 into outputs 𝑢 = (𝑢1, . . . , 𝑢𝑚) ∈ 𝑅+𝑚 and summarizes the set of all feasible 
input and output vectors: 𝑆 = {(𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ 𝑅+𝑛+𝑚: 𝑥 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑢}. Let J be the number of regional 
units. The n-dimensional input vector x is partitioned into fixed factors (indexed by f ) and variable 
factors (indexed by v): 𝑥 = (𝑥𝑓, 𝑥𝑣) . To determine the capacity output and CU, a radial output-
oriented efficiency measure is computed relative to a frontier technology providing the potential output 
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given the current input use: 𝐸0(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{ 𝜃: (𝑥, 𝜃𝑦) ∈ 𝑆}. 
Boat capacity output is defined as the maximum amount that can be produced per unit of 
time with existing equipment (assuming that the availability of variable factors of production is not 
restricted). The term “boat” capacity is used where the term “plant” capacity is used for other industry 
applications. In the context of fisheries, this definition corresponds to the maximum catch that a vessel 
can produce if the present technology is fully utilized given the biomass and the age structure of the 
fish stock under general working conditions. We note that this definition does not measure the capacity 
output level that can only be realized at a prohibitively high cost of input usage (and that hence will 
be economically unrealistic). This is because this boat capacity measure does not allow the reallocation 
of inputs and outputs across firms and implicitly assumes that the production of capacity output is 
feasible and that the necessary variable inputs are available (Kerstens et al., 2006). The production 
technology ?̂? of boat capacity can be represented as follows: 
?̂?𝑉𝑅𝑆 = {(𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ 𝑅+𝑁+𝑀: 𝑢𝑗𝑚 ≤ ∑ 𝑧𝑗𝑢𝑗𝑚,𝐽𝑗=1 𝑚 = 1, . . . , 𝑀; ∑ 𝑧𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑓 ≤𝐽𝑗=1 𝑥𝑗𝑓,
𝑓 = 1, . . . , 𝐹; ∑ 𝑧𝑗 = 1𝐽𝑗=1 , 𝑧𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝐽} 
(1) 
The output-oriented efficiency measure θ1 is measured using the following LP problem for 
each decision-making unit (DMU) (region or firm) j (j = 1, 2, ..., J) relative to the set of short-run 
production possibilities. Here we use most disaggregated regional unit as DMU as j: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜃1𝑗,𝑧𝑗  {𝜃1𝑗: (𝑥, 𝜃1𝑗𝑢) ∈ ?̂?𝑉𝑅𝑆} (2) 
To be consistent with the boat capacity definition, only the fixed inputs are bounded at their 
observed level, and the variable inputs in the production model are allowed to vary and be fully utilized. 
The computed outcome of the model is a scalar θ1. The θ1 shows by how much the production of each 
output in each region can be increased. In particular, capacity output for region k of the mth output is 𝜃1∗𝑘 multiplied by actual production, ukm. Therefore, capacity utilization based on observed output 
(subscripted “oo”) is as follows: 
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CU 𝑜𝑜𝑘 = 1𝜃1∗𝑘 (3) 
This ray CU measure may be biased downward (see Färe et al., 1994). This is because there 
is no guarantee that the observed outputs are not produced in a technically efficient way. The problem 
of technically efficient measures is solved when both the variable and the fixed inputs are constrained 
to their current level. Another technical efficiency measure is obtained by evaluating each region j = 
1, 2, ... , J relative to the production probability set SVRS: 
𝑆𝑉𝑅𝑆 = {(𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ 𝑅+𝑁+𝑀: 𝑢𝑗𝑚 ≤ ∑ 𝑧𝑗𝑢𝑗𝑚,𝐽𝑗=1 𝑚 = 1, . . . , 𝑀; ∑ 𝑧𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑛 ≤𝐽𝑗=1 𝑥𝑗𝑛,
𝑛 = 1, . . . , 𝑁; ∑ 𝑧𝑗 = 1𝐽𝑗=1 , 𝑧𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝐽} 
(4) 
The outcome (θ2) shows by how much production can be increased using technically 
efficient inputs:  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜃2𝑗,𝑧𝑗  {𝜃2𝑗: (𝑥, 𝜃1𝑗𝑢) ∈ 𝑆𝑉𝑅𝑆} (5) 
The technically efficient output vector is θ2 multiplied by the amount of observed production 
for each output. The unbiased ray measure of capacity utilization (subscripted “eo”) is calculated as 
follows: CU𝑒𝑜 𝑘 = 𝜃2∗𝑘𝜃1∗𝑘 (6) 
The unbiased measure of capacity is not the technically efficient output. The first measure 
includes both technical efficiency and capacity utilization effects; while the second measure includes 
only the technical efficiency effects, thus by dividing them provides the capacity utilization (i.e., it is 
unbiased) (see Färe et al., 1989; Felthoven and Morrison Paul, 2004; Holland and Lee, 2002). 
We focus on reallocating catches between vessels by explicitly allowing improvements in 
technical efficiency and capacity utilization rates. The model is developed in two steps as follows. An 
optimal activity vector z∗k is provided for region k from model (1), and thus, capacity output and the 
optimal use of fixed and variable inputs are computed in the first step: 
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𝑢𝑘𝑚∗ = ∑ 𝑧𝑗∗𝑘𝑢𝑗𝑚 − 𝑠𝑗𝑚∗𝑘 ;𝑗 𝑥𝑘𝑓∗ = ∑ 𝑧𝑗∗𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑓 + 𝑠𝑗𝑓∗𝑘;𝑗 𝑥𝑘𝑣∗ = ∑ 𝑧𝑗∗𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑣𝑗  (7) 
where 𝑠𝑗𝑚∗𝑘  and 𝑠𝑗𝑓∗𝑘 are the optimal surplus and slack variables corresponding to the output 
and fixed input dimensions, respectively. In a second step, these “optimal” frontier figures (i.e., 
capacity output and capacity variable and fixed inputs) at the regional level are used as parameters in 
the industry model. In particular, the industry model minimizes the industry use of fixed inputs radially 
such that the total production is at least at the current total level (or at a quota level in the model 
extended later) based on the reallocation of production between regions. Reallocation is allowed based 
on the frontier production and input usage for each region. In the short term, we assume that current 
capacities cannot be exceeded at either the regional or the industry level. We define Um as the industry 
output level of output m and Xf (Xv) as the aggregate fixed (variable) inputs available to the sector of 
factor f(v); i.e., 𝑈𝑚 = ∑ 𝑢𝑗𝑚;𝑗 𝑋𝑓 = ∑ 𝑥𝑓𝑗;𝑗 𝑋𝑣 = ∑ 𝑥𝑣𝑗𝑗  (8) 
The formulation of the multi-output and frontier-based industry model can then be specified 
as follows:  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝑤,𝑋𝑣𝜃 s.t. ∑ 𝑢𝑗𝑚∗ 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑚, 𝑚 = 1, . . . , 𝑀,𝑗       ∑ 𝑥𝑓𝑗∗ 𝑤𝑗 ≤ 𝜃𝑋𝑓, 𝑓 = 1, . . . , 𝐹,𝑗       −𝑋𝑣 + ∑ 𝑥𝑣𝑗∗ 𝑤𝑗 ≤ 0,𝑗 𝑣 = 1, . . . , 𝑉,      0 ≤ 𝑤𝑗 ≤ 1, 𝜃 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝐽, 
(9) 
where the optimal activity vector w represents a weight assigned to the vessel’s peers to estimate its 
capacity output. 
 
3.2. Extension of industry model 
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We now turn to the second-stage industry model (9). First, based on the second modification 
above, the constraints for each output dimension must reflect the fact that production may take place 
in different areas. That is, there are M output constraints (species) for each of the A areas: ∑ 𝑢𝑗𝑚𝑎∗ 𝑤𝑗𝑎∗ ≥ 𝑈𝑚𝑎 ,𝑗 𝑚 = 1, . . . , 𝑀, 𝑎 = 1, . . . , 𝐴 (10) 
Here, the data in this study are municipality data for each fishery type. Therefore, the optimal 
activity vector w∗ in this study denotes a weight allocated to each municipality to estimate each the 
capacity both in each fishery and each municipality.  
Each region j has one area a that corresponds to the location of each aggregated entity. The 
industry consists of fishery entities or vessels fishing in different areas. The constraints for each of the 
total fixed inputs can be formulated in the most general way in terms of constraints indexed by area: ∑ 𝑥𝑓𝑗𝑎∗ 𝑤𝑗𝑎∗ ≤ 𝜃𝑋𝑓,𝑗,𝑎 𝑓 = 1, . . . , 𝐹. (11) 
The constraints on the variable inputs are as follows:  −𝑋𝑣 + ∑ 𝑥𝑣𝑗𝑎∗ 𝑤𝑗𝑎∗ ≤ 0,𝑗,𝑎 𝑣 = 1, . . . , 𝑉. (12) 
To offer a menu of current and potential conservation and distributional policies in fisheries, 
we add some further refinements to the short-run industry model of Dervaux et al. (2000). Here, we 
focus on four issues: (i) tightening quotas for each species and (ii) the partial tolerance of technical 
inefficiencies. (i) We consider setting quotas such as the ITQs for particular species in Japan to 
illustrate how much capacity is necessary given a certain quota. We simply add the constraint: ∑ 𝑈𝑚𝑎 = 𝑈𝑚 ∙𝑎 𝑄𝑚,  𝑚 = 1,   0 ≤ 𝑄𝑚 ≤ 1 (13) 
given that the species are indexed by m, which is equal to 1 (i.e., the first output). Qm indicates a quota 
rate for the mth current industry output. In this study, Qm is incremented by 0.01 from 0 to 1 for the 
purpose of a sensitivity analysis.  
(ii) The frontier nature of the underlying technologies may push things too far so that it is 
practically impossible to require vessels to immediately adjust to technically efficient production plans. 
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While technical efficiency is a condition for any social optimum, realistic planning procedures may 
require tolerating technical inefficiency at some points for informational and political reasons (Peters, 
1985).  
This can be modeled by adjusting the capacity output, which is part of the second-stage 
industry model, based on its current observed technical inefficiency and ultimately using an efficiency 
improvement imperative (α) to correct it (see Kerstens el al., 2006). Of course, technically efficient 
regions need no such adjustment at present. Therefore, assuming that this correction factor is smaller 
than or equal to unity (α = 1), the adjustment of the second-stage capacity output could take the 
following form when technical inefficiency is (partially) accepted: 𝜃 ≥ 0, ?̂?𝑗𝑚𝑎∗ = 𝑢𝑗𝑚𝑎∗𝑚𝑎𝑥{ 1, 𝛼𝜃1∗} 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝐽, 𝑎 = 1, . . . , 𝐴 (14) 
In this research, α is 0.1 or 0.2 for all the entities when technical inefficiency is partially 
tolerated. When α is set as 0.1 or 0.2, the capacity outputs of all the entities are limited to 10 or 5 times 
the current output.  
We sum up the above-mentioned constraints, and our model can be presented as follows: 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝑤,𝑋𝑣𝜃 s.t. ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑚𝑎∗ 𝑤𝑗𝑎∗ ≥ 𝑈𝑚𝑎, 𝑚 = 1, . . . , 𝑀, 𝑎 = 1, . . . , 𝐴𝑗       ∑ 𝑥𝑓𝑗∗ 𝑤𝑗𝑎∗ ≤ 𝜃𝑋𝑓, 𝑓 = 1, . . . , 𝐹𝑗,𝑎       −𝑋𝑣 + ∑ 𝑥𝑣𝑗∗ 𝑤𝑗𝑎∗ ≤ 0, 𝑣 = 1, . . . , 𝑉𝑗,𝑎       ∑ 𝑈𝑚𝑎 = 𝑈𝑚 ⋅ 𝑎 𝑄𝑚, 𝑚 = 1       𝜃 ≥ 0, ?̂?𝑗𝑚𝑎∗ = 𝑢𝑗𝑚𝑎∗𝑚𝑎𝑥{ 1, 𝛼𝜃1∗}      𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝐽, 𝑎 = 1, . . . , 𝐴,  0 ≤ 𝑤𝑗𝑎∗ ≤ 1,0 ≤ 𝑄𝑚 ≤ 1. 
(15) 
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4. Data and scenarios 
4.1. Data 
The data used in this study come from the 11th Fishery Census of Japan of 2003 and Annual 
Statistics on Fishery and Fish Culture 2003 by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of 
Japan. The data set is composed of each aggregated fishery entity per municipality per marine fishery 
type in Japan. The 2003 Fishery Census of Japan was conducted to clarify the structures of fishery 
production in Japan and to explore the overall background on fisheries, including fishing villages, the 
marketing and processing industries, and other considerations. The purpose is to develop basic data 
for fishery policies, including improvements to the structure of fisheries.  
Our output data consist of production value data (in Japanese yen) and quantity data. There 
are nine types of outputs used in this study: total production quantity, all fish, other marine animals, 
Japanese sardines, Japanese jack mackerel, mackerel, Pacific saury, Alaska pollock, queen crab, and 
Japanese common squid. The TAC system in Japan applies to all seven of these species. For example, 
the squid showed a slight decline, although it still remains in a dominant position. The pollock has 
been on the decline mainly due to the subsequent decrease in the catch on the Bering high seas. 
Mackerel have also decreased drastically over the years.  
There are two variable inputs, labor, and fishing days, and two fixed inputs of gross 
registered, tons (Grt), and horse power (kilowatt), for aggregated fishery entities in each municipality 
and for each marine fishery type in Japan. The variable inputs are the number of workers on board at 
peak times and average fishing days for each aggregated entity. These data effectively cover all of the 
Japanese fishery entities. In total, 74,728 fishery entities are covered as part of the data set of 7,483 
observations. The total product value of these data accounts for 89.3% of the original data in the census. 
On average, each aggregated fishery entity consists of about 10 entities. We have 39 marine fishery 
classifications (Table 1). Small whaling, diving fisheries, shellfish collecting, seafood collecting, and 
other fisheries are excluded because we consider these fisheries to be atypical cases.  
We assume that management decisions are provided on the disaggregated regional level, 
especially models (1) and (4), because their decision making is applied to one particular area and one 
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particular fishery type. Thus, the efficiency of each aggregated fishery entity is evaluated relative to 
one of the potentially 351 different technologies (nine areas multiplied by thirty-nine marine fishery 
types). The technologies, which consist of only a few similar observations, may lead to biases in the 
estimation of boat capacity due to a lack of comparable production units. To avoid downward 
estimation, we use 10 large classifications and refer to the 10 and 39 fishery classifications as fishery 
types 1 and 2, respectively (see Table 1). Therefore, there are potentially 90 different technologies 
being used in fishery type 1 and 351 in type 2. We mainly use fishery type 1 and compare type 1 with 
type 2 in an unconstrained scenario. 
 
4.2. Scenarios 
In each specification, we use several different types of output variables. In the first two 
specifications, production value and production quantity are used as the output variables, and we 
compare the two levels of efficiency. Then, we divide the estimated production quantity into three 
categories, which are (a) TAC species, and the others including (b) fish and (c) the other marine 
animals. The aim of this division is to set production quotas only for particular TAC species and to 
compare the efficiency levels of the different groups.  
We classify a series of scenarios, systematically testing the effect of additional constraints. 
The results of several policy-oriented scenarios with various constraints are useful in indicating policy 
implications. These scenarios are summarized in Table 2. Basic scenario 1 is the basic industry model 
without any particular constraints and uses fishery type 1. Basic scenario 2 uses fishery type 2 without 
any particular constraints. The tolerated technical inefficiency scenario allows for technical 
inefficiency but already imposes improvement imperatives of 1,000% and 500% (thus, α = 0.1 and 
0.2). We compute the optimal inputs in the industry model, implementing the 100% quota for current 
outputs (which is, essentially, no quota constraint (i.e., Q1 = 1 in Eq. (13)) at each technical inefficiency 
value.  
We also estimate optimal fishery expenditures at the current 100% quota to understand how 
much expenditure could be reduced in a reallocated world. We focus on four kinds of expenditure in 
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particular: expenditure on vessels, fishing gears, oil, and wages, which appear to change as the amount 
of fishery inputs varies. However, we have only the production value data as mentioned above. 
Therefore, we roughly estimate the fishery expenditures related to marine fishery operations using the 
production value and the optimal inputs at current 100% quota levels.  
We use the number of marine fishery entities and the average fishery income and 
expenditures by organization type as well as total fishery income for fishery households and the whole 
of the industry according to the 11th Fishery Census of Japan of 2003 and Statistical Survey Report 
on Fishery Management of 2003 (Table 3). We consider only four kinds of organizations: individuals, 
including family businesses and independent fishermen; firms; and joint management. These are the 
categories used to calculate the fishery income and expenditures in the whole industry, while the others 
are not included because we have no detailed earnings statements for them and the numbers of entities 
in these fishery organizations is low. We compute the numbers of family businesses and employment 
operations based on the total fishery income for fishery households, and we estimate the fishery 
income and expenditures for the whole fishing industry in Japan. Although there is indeed only a small 
difference between the actual value and the estimated value for total fishery income, the total estimate 
values for vessels, fishing gear, oil, wages, and cost depreciation are 3.7%, 3.2%, 11.8%, 25.7%, and 
8.4% of the total estimated fishery income, respectively.  
First, to estimate cost reduction in the scenarios analyzed, we simply multiply the total 
fishery income of the sample data, 932.2 billion yen, by the fishery expenditure ratios estimated above 
and the total estimated expenditures on vessels, fishing gear, oil, wages, and cost depreciation in the 
sample, which amount to 34.1, 29.5, 110.2, 239.2, and 78.2 billion yen, respectively. Then, we assume 
that the expenditures on vessels and fishing gear are correlated with the efficiency score, i.e., θ in Eq. 
(15).We also assume that the oil costs are correlated with the optimal use of tonnage multiplied by the 
number of fishing days at the current 100% quota; i.e., ∑(𝑤𝑗∗ ⋅ 𝑥𝑓,1∗ ) ⋅ (𝑤𝑗∗ ⋅ 𝑥𝑣,1∗ ). Finally, we assume 
that the wage costs relate to the optimal use of labor multiplied by the number of fishing days at the 
current 100% quota, i.e., ∑(𝑤𝑗∗ ⋅ 𝑥𝑣,1∗ ) ⋅ (𝑤𝑗∗ ⋅ 𝑥𝑣,2∗ ) . To estimate the expenditures, we multiply the 
estimated expenditure on vessels (which includes the expenses associated with vessels themselves and 
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fishing gear), oil, and wages in the first step by θ, ∑ 𝑤𝑗∗2⋅𝑥𝑓,1∗ ⋅𝑥𝑣,1∗(𝑋𝑓,1⋅𝑋𝑣,1)  and ∑ 𝑤𝑗∗2⋅𝑥𝑣,1∗ ⋅𝑥𝑣,2∗(𝑋𝑣,1⋅𝑋𝑣,2) , respectively.  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Scenario analysis 
5.1.1. Current and capacity outputs 
Scenarios 1 and 2 show the results achieved by comparing current output and capacity 
outputs (see Fig. 2). In the figure, the vertical and horizontal axes represent percentages of total 
production values and fixed inputs, respectively. The results are calculated with LP and show what 
production values fixed inputs can maximally produce based on each scenario. Similarly, Fig. 3 shows 
what production quantities the fixed inputs can maximally produce based on each scenario.  
The results indicate that there is large excess capacity in Japanese fisheries. This reflects the 
fact that fisheries management is in a state of crisis. Because access is almost free, fishing activity is 
under-priced, and therefore, a huge amount of effort is devoted to fishing. Based on the concept of 
constant returns to scale, 1% of the total fixed inputs produces 1% of the total outputs, and the path of 
the current output will be linear. Note that efficiency implies the average efficiency of each scenario 
if we do not specify otherwise. This is because current output is calculated with LP, which seeks to 
combine DMUs to minimize a requisite amount of the fixed inputs for a certain amount of output. On 
the other hand, the more varied the efficiency levels of the aggregated entities are, the more curved 
the line of capacity outputs becomes because 1% of the total outputs can be produced by less than 1% 
of the fixed inputs.  
Comparing the current outputs of the production values and quantities in Fig. 3, the current 
output of the production values has a less curved line than that of the quantities. This implies that each 
DMU determines the amount of fixed inputs depending on expected values rather than expected 
quantities and that this is legitimate decision making depending on the estimation of income and 
expenditures for each fishery.  
Comparing the capacity outputs of the production values and quantities, the capacity outputs 
18 
 
of the production values are smaller than those of the quantities. The difference between these numeric 
values may result from the varied efficiency levels based on the entities’ valid decision-making and 
cost-benefit considerations.  
 
5.1.2. Capacity outputs 
We show two results indicating efficiency levels using the production value data and the 
quantity data. First, Fig. 4 shows the capacity outputs of production values based on each scenario. 
Sensitivity analyses are provided by changing the total quota, and in each case, efficiency is computed. 
The quota is used as the horizontal line in the figure. Here, inefficiency in this figure is defined as a 
percentage reduction of fixed inputs and is determined by applying Eq. (15). According to the results, 
efficiency levels based on 100% of production value (i.e., the current level of production) as the total 
quota are 0.102 in basic scenario 1 and 0.169 in basic scenario 2. In the scenarios at current 100% 
quotas considering areas of technical inefficiency of up to 10 and 5 times, efficiency scores of 0.156 
(0.239) and 0.210 (0.292) emerge in the scenarios using fishery type 1 (type 2), and the efficiency 
scores decrease by approximately 5% at regular intervals as α varies from 1 to 0.1. Fig. 5 shows the 
capacity output of computed product quantities based on each scenario. The results show efficiency 
levels at the 100% quota of 0.072 and 0.130 in basic scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. These scenarios 
are relatively efficient and similar to those for production value. In the scenarios at the current 100% 
quotas considering technical inefficiency of up to 10 and 5 times, the efficiency scores 0.96 (0.170) 
and 0.125 (0.197) emerge in the scenarios using fishery type 1 (type 2), and the efficiency scores 
decrease by about 2.5% at regular intervals as α drops from 1 to 0.1.  
 
5.1.3. TAC species 
We show the results of the sensitive analyses achieved by only imposing a quota on the TAC 
species as ITQ. Figure 6 shows the result achieved when the total product quantities are separated into 
two groups: the quantity for all TAC species and that for all non-TAC species. The efficiency scores 
at a 100% quota are 0.109 and 0.169 in basic scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. In addition, the paths of 
19 
 
each scenario curve alongside each other and are approximately parallel. In the scenarios at current 
100% quotas considering technical inefficiency of up to 10 and 5 times, the efficiency scores 0.135 
(0.205) and 0.168 (0.231) emerge in the scenarios using fishery type 1 (type 2), respectively, and the 
efficiency scores decline by about 3% at regular intervals as α varies from 1 to 0.1.  
Additionally, Fig. 7 shows the results that are achieved when the total product quantities are 
divided into three categories: the quantities for TAC species, those of other fish, and those for other 
marine animals. The paths of each scenario are also approximately parallel alongside each other. 
Efficiency levels at the 100% quota are 0.145 and 0.190 in basic scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. In the 
scenarios at the current 100% quotas considering technical inefficiency of up to 10 and 5 times, the 
efficiency scores 0.177 (0.222) and 0.204 (0.246) emerge in the scenarios using fishery type 1 (type 
2), respectively.  
We also provide the results that are achieved when we impose a quota on each of the six 
TAC species. First, Fig. 8 shows the results using two categories: (1) the six TAC species and (2) one 
other species. Given a 100% ITQ quota, the efficiency levels in the scenarios for Japanese sardines, 
Japanese jack mackerel, and mackerel are 0.086, 0.088, and 0.089, respectively, and the efficiency 
paths for these species vary slightly as each ITQ quota decreases. At a 100% ITQ quota, efficiency 
levels in the scenarios for Pacific saury, Alaska pollock, and Japanese common squid are 0.093, 0.099, 
and 0.099, respectively. The efficiency paths vary more than those for the others as each ITQ quota 
decreases. The efficiency level of the queen crab fishery is 0.084 at a 100% ITQ quota, and the 
efficiency path is the lowest found in any of the scenarios.  
In contrast, the efficiency of basic scenario 1, which imposes a quota on total quantities of 
all TAC species, is 0.109 if the current industry quota is used. The score is the most inefficient found 
in any of the scenarios. This result suggests that there are fewer activity vectors to choose from for the 
aggregated entities to satisfy the quota for each TAC species. In this case, the quota is imposed only 
on a certain TAC species, and thus, the other fisheries have the capacity to catch 100% of current 
output. Therefore, there are fewer options in choosing fixed input factors given that quota imposed on 
TAC species and the efficiency paths change more horizontally. 
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Fig. 9 shows the results using each of six TAC species, other fish and other marine animals. 
Efficiency levels at a 100% quota are 0.109 in the Japanese sardine scenario, 0.110 in the Japanese 
jack mackerel scenario, 0.112 in the Mackerel scenario, 0.118 in the Pacific saury scenario, 0.117 in 
the Alaska pollock scenario, 0.108 in the queen crab scenario, 0.139 in the Japanese common squid 
scenario and 0.145 in the all-TAC-species scenario. The efficiency paths of the Japanese sardine and 
queen crab scenarios are the lowest, and that of the all-TAC-species scenario is the most inefficient. 
The same is true for the paths using two variables above. Most scenarios for each TAC species are 
stationary at less than 60% of each quota.  
These varied efficiency levels depend on the selection of outputs. When each output in each 
category is separated in different model, the efficiency score will become even lower. It is difficult to 
measure the efficiency of each fishery method because there are many fishery species in the Japanese 
sea and many fishery methods developed in the same regions. While we can estimate efficiency levels 
in various detailed cases using more disaggregated categories, it will become difficult to discuss entire 
fisheries in Japan in doing so. The opposite is also true. Based on the results, the efficiency paths seem 
to be approximately the same in the different cases; they only vary based on the quota for each TAC 
species.  
In summary, ensuring the current capacity outputs (except for certain TAC species), the fixed 
inputs can satisfy the capacity outputs for the TAC species. Regarding the capacity output of the total 
quantity per fishery area in basic scenarios 1 and 2, the most efficient area is the Pacific Ocean in the 
north. Most areas have excess capacity of more than 100% in basic scenario 2. This result implies that 
there are fixed inputs that can produce more than twice the current quantities in Japan.  
The fisheries with the lowest excess capacity are those for Pacific saury. There are excess 
capacities of 39.0% and 38.9% for Pacific saury using two variables and three variables as above 
(fishery type 1). The most inefficient fisheries are those for Japanese common squid, with excess 
capacities of 212.3% and 205.2%.  
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5.1.4. Capacity utilization  
We estimate the CUoo and CUeo of total production value and quantity in basic scenarios 1 
and 2. Table 4 presents simple average CUoo and CUeo figures for the aggregated entities. These are 
not weighted average values, and they are classified by fishery types 1 and 2. There are significant 
differences between the values of CUoo and CUeo for the different fishery types.  
In the basic scenario 1 using estimated quantity data (specifications 3 and 4), the fisheries 
with the highest average CUoo, i.e., CUoo = 1, are large trawls in East China sea, large and medium 
surrounding net of one-boat operation catching skipjack and tuna on distant water and two-boats 
operation with purse seine (fishery type 2: (2), (11) and (14)). In specification 3, the fishery with the 
lowest average CUoo is anglings (fishery type 1: (10)), and the CUoo is 0.113. 
In specification 4, the fisheries with the highest average CUeo (i.e., CUeo = 1) are large trawls 
in the East China Sea, large and medium catching skipjack and tuna in distant waters and off-shore 
water, two-boat operations with purse seine, and squid angling in distant water (fishery type 2: (2), 
(11), (12), (14) and (34)). In specification 4, the fishery with the lowest average CUeo is squid angling 
in coastal water (fishery type 2: (36)); the CUeo is 0.486.  
The difference between CUeo and CUoo shows the degree of random variation in catch and 
technical inefficiency, which is not producing the full potential given the level of both fixed and 
variable inputs. The fisheries with the lowest differences between CUeo and CUoo (i.e., CUeo – CUoo = 
0) are distant water trawls, large trawls in the East China Sea, large and medium catching skipjack and 
tuna in distant water, two-boat operations with purse seine and billfish drift gill nets (fishery type 2: 
(1), (2), (11), (14) and (19)). The fishery with the greatest difference between the CUeo and CUoo 
figures is angling (fishery type 1: (10)), and the difference value is 0.459. 
 
5.2. Reducing the number of fishery entities  
We compute the amount of non-zero activity vectors w∗ from the results above and provide 
the optimal number of aggregated fishery entities at the current 100% quota for each sea area around 
Japan. Chosen from all the scenarios using the quantity data from the 7,483 entities in our sample, the 
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optimal total number of fishery entities at a 100% quota are as follows: (1) 1,167 at a minimum in the 
technically tolerated inefficiency scenario up to 10 times of each current output using one variable 
output and (2) 2,692 at a maximum in the technically tolerated inefficiency scenario up to 10 times of 
each current output using the three variable outputs. 
On average the optimal total DMU numbers are about 2,000. The values of the activity 
vectors are almost at upper limits among all the scenarios (i.e., all inputs are utilized).We compute the 
numbers of fishery entities, which is 74,727 in the overall sample, by multiplying the active vector 
values and the numbers of entities in each aggregated entity level. The minimum number is 4,974.7 in 
the basic scenario 1 using the quantities data of one variable output. The maximum number is 21,184.7 
in the basic scenario 2 using the production value data allowing technical inefficiency up to five times 
of each current output.  
We note that there are large differences among the optimal sizes of fishery entities in each 
scenario at 100% quota. On average, however, the optimal size of the current Japanese fisheries fishing 
the amount of current production value/quantity is about one third of current size. In other words, one 
third of the current fishery entities are required even if the central government implements fishery 
policies in the most efficient way. 
 
5.3. The optimal input levels 
We compute the optimal input amounts at the current 100% quota for each scenario. In each 
scenario at the current 100% quota, the optimal input values in gross registered tons and horsepower 
(kilowatts) are equal to each efficiency score, i.e., θ. In each similar scenario, we set the average 
optimal fishing days as the simple average 𝑤𝑗∗ ⋅ 𝑥𝑣,1∗  among DMUs with 𝑤𝑗∗ ≠ 0 and the optimal 
number of fishermen as ∑ 𝑤𝑗∗ ⋅ 𝑥𝑣,2∗ . 
Under basic scenarios 1 and 2, using the production value data at the 100% quota, the 
average optimal numbers of fishing days are 113.32% and 112.72% of the current average fishing days 
spent on board, and the total optimal numbers of fishermen are 35.69% and 43.81% of the current 
totals, respectively. Under the technical inefficiency scenarios, allowing capacity outputs to be up to 
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10 and 5 times current outputs using the production quantity data for fishery type 1 (type 2), the 
average optimal numbers of fishing days are 119.43% (114.81%) and 120.45% (116.50%) of the 
current average fishing days spent on board, and the total optimal numbers of fishermen are 41.62% 
(53.83%) and 48.59% (58.45%) the current totals, respectively. In summary, in each scenario at the 
100% quota, the optimal numbers of fishermen and the optimal average fishing days are about 40% 
and 120% of current totals.  
Going through the amounts of optimal inputs for each fishery type, we see that the most 
efficient way of allocating the fishery types is different for specific fishery types. In addition, a fishery 
type with a large amount of optimal inputs may not be an efficient method itself but may yield large 
capacity outputs arising from optimal inputs based on the first step, the revised industry model. 
Relatively large amounts of optimal inputs are needed in types of surrounding nets (4), lift nets (6) and 
fixed nets (7) among others, and long lines (9) in particular are little utilized. 
 
5.4. Estimates of cost reduction 
We compute the fishery expenditures for each scenario in Table 5. Overall, the required costs 
of vessels, fishing gear, and oil (in our computed cases) are mostly less than about 20% of current 
costs, and the wages and total costs are mostly about 40% and 30%, respectively. In basic scenario 1 
(basic scenario 2), using one output variable for the production value, the necessary costs of vessels 
and fishing gear, oil, and wages amount to 10.21% (16.93%), 11.99% (19.31%), and 35.26% (44.14%), 
and the overall costs amount to 25.20% (33.33%), respectively. 
The reduction in the total number of fishing vessels represents a large amount of the 
reduction in the total cost in the long run. These significant potential results are important for policy 
purposes. In basic scenario 1 (scenario 2), using the production value data, the results imply that the 
current estimated fishery profit (total 133.3 billion yen) will be increased to 442.2 (408.6) billion yen. 
In addition, the fishery profits should increase because the cost depreciation related to the fishery 
operations, which is left out of consideration, should decrease in the long run. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
This article examines the capacity output and CU of marine fisheries in Japan. Our results 
indicate that the maximum level of production that the fixed inputs are capable of supporting under 
general working conditions (i.e., capacity output) could be more than three times larger than what is 
currently produced. Estimated CUs vary greatly from one marine fishery to another, but overall fixed 
inputs could be reduced to one tenth of their current level. Fishery profits could be increased to about 
three times their current level. 
Our results for Japan indicate much greater potential for improvement than Kerstens et al. 
(2006) found for Denmark. The differences between the two scenarios are caused by the large 
differences in fishery management level (or efficiency). The creation of profitable and sustainable 
fisheries requires retiring the most inefficient fishers, through a government-backed industry 
development program. This study does not discuss the details of input and output control policies. 
Political factors often favor input-oriented approaches to managing fisheries. However, there appears 
to be increasing acceptance of output-oriented controls used to manage catches of target fishes 
(Holland, 2007). Our approach is not market-based but we show the expected outcome of output-
oriented controls. For the output-oriented controls to be implemented inexpensively, improvements in 
remote automated monitoring technology need to increase the feasibility and then diminish the cost of 
outcome controls. 
Our study shows that there are many inefficient fisheries. To help them exit the industry, 
buyback programs may need to be increased. However, higher government subsidies should be 
carefully considered before they are implemented. Simple buyback programs that purchase inefficient 
vessels out of a fishery will not help to solve the overcapacity problem (see Asche et al., 2008; Clark 
et al., 2005; Holland et al., 1999). First, the buyback programs might at best remove only a marginal 
portion of the fishing fleets, with less efficient vessels remaining in the fisheries. Secondly, buyback 
programs will not work properly without other work opportunities for fishermen who leave a fishery. 
Additionally, incentives remain for vessels to increase their own level of capitalization. Finally, even 
if the buyback programs were effective, the programs would significantly reduce employment in the 
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fisheries and local communities because there is a close relationship between the number of vessels 
and the number of fishermen. This development would run counter to social policies concerned with 
protecting societies along remote coastlines (Asche et al., 2008). 
In conclusion, legislating for property rights over fisheries is necessary to stop the 
downward spiral of this industry. Our approach estimates the optimal cost reduction and profitability 
that is achievable under Japan’s current fishing activity management system, run by central planners. 
One might also consider potential efficiency in fisheries based on other mechanisms such as individual 
transferrable quotas (ITQs) (MAFF, 2008). Either way, the potential magnitude of gains demonstrated 
in this article has important implications for fisheries policy in Japan and elsewhere. 
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Table 1. Technology (marine fisheries) 
 
Fishery 
type 1 
Large 
classification 
Small classification (39 types of fishery): Fishery type 2 
1 Trawls (1) Distant water trawls, (2) Large trawls in East China sea, Off-shore 
trawl ( (3) one-boat operation, (4) two-boats operation), Small trawl ((5) 
“Teguri” type 1, (6) other kind of “Teguri”, (7) Small sail trawl) 
2 Boat seine (8) Drag net, (9) Pulling net 
3 Beach seine (10) Beach seine 
4 Surrounding 
nets 
Large and medium surrounding net ((11) One-boat operation (skipjack and 
tuna on distant water), (12) One-boat operation (skipjack and tuna on off-
shore water), (13) Other than skipjack and tuna, one-boat operation), (14) 
Two-boats operation, Purse seine ((15) One-boat operation, (16) Two-
boats operation, (17) Other surrounding nets) 
5 Gill nets (18) Salmon drift gill net, (19) Billfish drift gill net, (20) Other gill nets 
6 Lift nets (21) Saury stick-held dip net, (22) Other lift nets 
7 Fixed net (23) Large set net, (24) Salmon set net, (25) Small set net 
8 Other nets (26) Other nets 
9 Long lines (27) Tuna long line on distant water, (28) Tuna long line on off-shore 
water, (29) Tuna long line on coastal water, (30) Other long lines 
10 Anglings (31) Skipjack pole-and-line on district water, (32) Skipjack pole-and-line 
on off-shore water, (33) Skipjack pole-and-line on coastal water, (34) 
Squid angling on distant water, (35) Squid angling on off-shore water, (36) 
Squid angling on coastal water, (37) Mackerel angling, (38) Trolling line 
fishery, (39) Other anglings 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Scenario Options 
 
Scenario Constraints of formulation (17) involved 
Basic Scenario 1  10; 0 1;Q =    fishery type 1 
Basic Scenario 2  10; 0 1;Q =    fishery type 2 
Tolerating technical 
inefficiency (up to ×10) 10.1; 0 1;Q =    fishery type1 or 2 
Tolerating technical 
inefficiency (up to ×5) 10.2; 0 1;Q =    fishery type1 or 2 
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Table 3. Estimated marine fishery income and fishery expenditures of the whole fishing industry in Japan in 2003 
 
  Individual
s 
 Firms Joint 
management 
Fisheries 
cooperative 
Fisheries 
productive 
cooperation 
Public 
office 
Total  
# of entities  73,868  1,651 2,561 167 111 58 78,416   
Average marine fishing entities           
  Family 
operation 
Employment 
operation 
       
Fishery income (million yen) 5.4  69.8  293.6  51.3  unknown unknown unknown unknown  
Fishery expenditures 3.2  71.5  310.5  42.0       
 Wage 0.4  24.6  110.3  15.3       
 Vessels 0.3  1.3  9.2  0.4      
 Fishing gears 0.2  2.0  8.5  1.2       
 Oil 0.5  9.6  42.0  5.1       
 Sale fee 0.3  3.1  11.1  2.5       
 Cost depreciation 0.6  6.0  22.6  1.8       
Fishery profit 2.3  −1.8  −16.9  9.2       
Fishery income 5.4  69.8  293.6  51.3       
           
Total fishery income (million yen) 480,981.0        1,063,333.1   
Estimated value           
  Family 
operation 
Employment 
operation 
       
 Estimated # of entities 72,605 1,263        
Fishery income (million yen) 392,865.7  88,115.3  484,690.7  131,317.8     1,096,989.5  100.0% 
Fishery expenditures 229,431.8  90,355.9  512,642.1  107,646.5     940,076.3  85.7% 
 Wage 29,042.0  31,121.4  182,138.3  39,134.6     281,436.4  25.7% 
 Vessels 22,217.1  1,597.7  15,169.4  1,132.0     40,116.2  3.7% 
 Fishing gears 14,956.6  2,577.8  14,028.5  3,139.8     34,702.7  3.2% 
 Oil 35,068.2  12,118.4  69,370.1  13,084.1     129,640.9  11.8% 
 Sale fee 22,362.3  3,964.5  18,382.2  6,305.2     51,014.3  4.7% 
 Cost depreciation 42,546.5  7,610.8  37,306.0  4,604.7     92,068.0  8.4% 
Fishery profit  163,433.9  −2,240.6  −27,949.8  23,671.3     156,914.9  14.3% 
 
Notes: The data comes from the 11th Fishery Census of Japan of 2003 and Statistical Survey Report on Fishery Management of 2003. 
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Table 4. Simple average Capacity Utilization among aggregated entities per fishery type  
 
      Basic scenario 1    Basic scenario 2    
 
 
    
Production value   
Estimated 
Production 
Quantities  
 Production 
value  
Estimated 
Production  
Quantities 
 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fishery 
type1 
Fishery 
type2 
Pelagic 
fishery 
Offshore 
fishery 
Coastal 
fishery 
obs 
ooCU  eoCU  ooCU  eoCU  ooCU  eoCU  ooCU  eoCU  
Total  ✓ ✓ ✓  0.251  0.628  0.230  0.641  0.355  0.660  0.355  0.660  
1  ✓ ✓ ✓ 898 0.272  0.689  0.238  0.676  0.456  0.731  0.456  0.731  
 1 ✓   4 0.557  0.629  1.000  1.000  0.579  0.620  1.000  1.000  
 2 ✓   4 0.254  0.848  0.793  0.793  0.274  0.683  0.793  0.793  
 3  ✓  66 0.535  0.742  0.707  0.788  0.587  0.766  0.707  0.788  
 4  ✓  12 0.859  0.933  0.949  0.951  0.508  0.822  0.949  0.951  
 5  ✓ ✓ 189 0.354  0.722  0.448  0.709  0.146  0.712  0.448  0.709  
 6  ✓ ✓ 614 0.206  0.667  0.413  0.724  0.223  0.654  0.413  0.724  
 7  ✓ ✓ 9 0.225  0.750  0.700  0.797  0.141  0.628  0.700  0.797  
2   ✓ ✓ 488 0.368  0.694  0.344  0.700  0.441  0.706  0.441  0.706  
 8  ✓ ✓ 326 0.348  0.651  0.400  0.681  0.367  0.657  0.400  0.681  
 9  ✓ ✓ 162 0.408  0.780  0.522  0.756  0.296  0.786  0.522  0.756  
3 10   ✓ 24 0.763  0.830  0.763  0.830  0.763  0.830  0.763  0.830  
4  ✓ ✓ ✓ 204 0.387  0.762  0.344  0.750  0.610  0.778  0.610  0.778  
 11 ✓   8 0.888  0.923  1.000  1.000  0.688  0.874  1.000  1.000  
 12  ✓  3 0.893  0.982  0.934  1.000  0.397  0.929  0.934  1.000  
 13  ✓  25 0.657  0.820  0.737  0.802  0.691  0.836  0.737  0.802  
 14  ✓  4 0.603  0.916  1.000  1.000  0.906  0.942  1.000  1.000  
 15  ✓ ✓ 98 0.307  0.779  0.526  0.752  0.236  0.761  0.526  0.752  
 16  ✓ ✓ 29 0.331  0.721  0.603  0.781  0.333  0.684  0.603  0.781  
 17  ✓ ✓ 37 0.290  0.640  0.603  0.739  0.262  0.650  0.603  0.739  
5   ✓ ✓ 1546 0.236  0.649  0.234  0.654  0.245  0.623  0.245  0.623  
 18  ✓ ✓ 10 0.365  0.637  0.532  0.601  0.248  0.689  0.532  0.601  
 19  ✓ ✓ 11 0.614  0.796  0.993  0.993  0.647  0.840  0.993  0.993  
 20  ✓ ✓ 1525 0.233  0.648  0.237  0.620  0.231  0.653  0.237  0.620  
6   ✓ ✓ 176 0.542  0.744  0.511  0.736  0.593  0.766  0.593  0.766  
 21  ✓ ✓ 50 0.672  0.814  0.693  0.833  0.682  0.822  0.693  0.833  
 22  ✓ ✓ 126 0.490  0.717  0.553  0.740  0.443  0.702  0.553  0.740  
7    ✓ 1145 0.226  0.602  0.221  0.600  0.339  0.655  0.339  0.655  
 23   ✓ 300 0.331  0.750  0.380  0.692  0.328  0.749  0.380  0.692  
 24   ✓ 82 0.254  0.506  0.295  0.504  0.256  0.506  0.295  0.504  
 25   ✓ 763 0.182  0.554  0.328  0.657  0.175  0.552  0.328  0.657  
8 26  ✓ ✓ 96 0.433  0.636  0.433  0.636  0.433  0.636  0.433  0.636  
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9  ✓ ✓ ✓ 707 0.374  0.730  0.364  0.741  0.473  0.722  0.473  0.722  
 27 ✓   59 0.474  0.821  0.684  0.801  0.401  0.821  0.684  0.801  
 28  ✓  68 0.644  0.883  0.733  0.892  0.684  0.890  0.733  0.892  
 29  ✓ ✓ 60 0.420  0.716  0.602  0.716  0.394  0.746  0.602  0.716  
 30  ✓ ✓ 520 0.322  0.701  0.399  0.692  0.315  0.712  0.399  0.692  
10  ✓ ✓ ✓ 2199 0.150  0.529  0.113  0.572  0.292  0.611  0.292  0.611  
 31 ✓   18 0.715  0.894  0.799  0.802  0.749  0.885  0.799  0.802  
 32  ✓  17 0.701  0.885  0.853  0.876  0.664  0.869  0.853  0.876  
 33  ✓ ✓ 36 0.227  0.500  0.625  0.827  0.210  0.565  0.625  0.827  
 34 ✓   7 0.624  0.811  0.995  1.000  0.674  0.785  0.995  1.000  
 35  ✓  27 0.346  0.589  0.723  0.812  0.379  0.626  0.723  0.812  
 36  ✓ ✓ 493 0.208  0.484  0.270  0.486  0.188  0.521  0.270  0.486  
 37  ✓ ✓ 16 0.085  0.435  0.726  0.769  0.085  0.477  0.726  0.769  
 38  ✓ ✓ 310 0.118  0.406  0.287  0.492  0.106  0.450  0.287  0.492  
 39  ✓ ✓ 1275 0.111  0.566  0.259  0.667  0.059  0.613  0.259  0.667  
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Table 5. Computed Fishery Expenditures of Each Scenario 
 
 Costs   Total 
 Vessels & 
Fishing gears 
(  ) 
Oil 
2
, ,2 , ,1
,1 ,1
j j f j v
f v
w x x
X X
       

 
Wages 
2
, ,1 , ,2
,1 ,2
j j v j v
v v
w x x
X X
       

 
 
Current situation (unit: billions of yen) 63.5 110.2 239.2 412.9 
1 output; Production value     
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 10.21% 11.99% 35.26% 25.20% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 15.57% 18.72% 45.43% 33.71% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 20.96% 25.15% 53.65% 41.02% 
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 16.93% 19.31% 44.14% 33.33% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 23.93% 25.16% 50.82% 39.83% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 29.21% 32.96% 61.49% 48.90% 
1 output; Production quantity     
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 7.21% 8.30% 28.78% 20.00% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 9.62% 11.62% 27.51% 20.52% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 12.55% 10.79% 31.81% 23.24% 
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 12.99% 14.64% 35.64% 26.55% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 17.00% 19.20% 40.87% 31.41% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 19.74% 22.05% 44.24% 34.55% 
2 outputs; TAC and other species     
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 10.90% 12.73% 36.54% 26.24% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 13.50% 16.20% 39.98% 29.56% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 16.84% 20.19% 44.78% 33.92% 
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 16.89% 19.77% 42.99% 32.78% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 20.47% 23.51% 47.88% 37.16% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 23.07% 25.98% 51.10% 40.08% 
2 outputs; Each species and other species     
Japanese sardine 8.60% 9.60% 26.24% 19.09% 
Japanese jack mackerel 8.77% 10.17% 30.58% 21.78% 
Mackerel 8.87% 10.26% 28.89% 20.84% 
Pacific saury  9.29% 11.13% 37.32% 26.02% 
Alaska Pollock  9.85% 11.24% 35.95% 25.34% 
Queen crab  8.42% 9.48% 30.45% 21.46% 
Japanese Common Squid  9.87% 11.56% 29.49% 21.69% 
3 outputs; TAC, other fish and other marine 
animals     
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 14.46% 16.75% 44.17% 32.28% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 17.72% 20.62% 46.94% 35.42% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 20.39% 23.75% 49.77% 38.30% 
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 18.99% 22.05% 46.28% 35.61% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 22.19% 25.37% 51.08% 39.77% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 24.56% 27.60% 53.59% 42.18% 
3 outputs; 
Each species, other fish and other marine 
animals 
    
Japanese sardine 10.94% 12.29% 31.36% 23.13% 
Japanese jack mackerel 10.96% 12.58% 35.48% 25.59% 
Mackerel 11.21% 12.75% 33.78% 24.69% 
Pacific saury  11.84% 13.90% 40.44% 28.96% 
Alaska Pollock  11.72% 13.25% 38.13% 27.43% 
Queen crab  10.78% 12.11% 32.25% 23.57% 
Japanese Common Squid  13.88% 15.82% 40.58% 29.86% 
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Appendix Policy Brief (only online version) 
In general, the existence of overcapitalization is often attributed to the lack of property rights 
for fisheries (Pascoe et al., 2004). Various types of property rights with different characteristics have 
been used to address common-pool resource externalities and include the community management of 
fisheries (Grafton et al., 2000). Japan’s coastal fisheries, in particular, appear to satisfy the conditions 
for enduring community rights (Asche et al., 2008). This is because most coastal fisheries in Japan 
illustrate how communities can effectively manage resources in a sustainable way and provide 
substantial benefits to fishers through a mix of community and private rights (Ruddle, 1989; 
Yamamoto, 1995).  
Meanwhile, the transferability of individual quotas provides incentives for efficient 
harvesters to acquire quotas from less efficient harvesters, leading to a reduction in harvesting capacity 
(Asche et al. 2008). This will improve overall harvesting efficiency in the fisheries and generate rent. 
In principle, a well-designed individual transferable quota (ITQ) system – one of the catch share 
systems – will allow resource rents to be generated through a reduction in excess capacity arising from 
quota trading, although there is also evidence that this is a long-term process that may take substantial 
time (Grafton et al., 2000; Asche et al., 2008).  
Due to a lack of property rights, the close-knit communities of fisheries in Japan will be 
mostly unwilling to admit that it is necessary to improve management efficiency via productive 
fishermen or fishing entities. Profitable communities would be reluctant to receive productive 
fishermen from outside because community members would not want to decrease their present profit 
and because young people living in the communities would desire to take any open positions. On the 
other hand, unprofitable fishery communities would also not want to include outside fishermen or 
restructure because already low profits might be further subdivided. Even if unprofitable communities 
seem to recruit outside fishermen, there could only be jobs available that do not allow for high 
productivity, jobs that even the young people living there would not want to do in most cases.  
However, all ITQ programs share the problem of initial quota allocations to fishers (Grafton 
et al., 1996). In many countries, the implementation of the individual property rights system has been 
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difficult because of political, ideological and regulatory issues. For example, there are strong obstacles 
to the implementation of incentive-based policies such as ITQs in Japan because no previous studies 
have estimated the potential of alternative policies and there is concern about opening the community 
up to the possibility of an uncertain outcome (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan 
(MAFF), 2008).  
In the theoretical and empirical economic literature on fisheries, the recommended policy 
prescription for fisheries management is the catch shares system. Catch shares grant each fisherman 
the right to harvest a given percentage of the total allowable catch. Each fisherman has an incentive to 
manage his percentage well because the value of these shares increases with the productivity of the 
fishery product. For example, Costello et al. (2008) show that the fisheries management strategy of 
catch shares can reverse a collapse in fisheries. They find that the proportion of fisheries managed by 
ITQs that had gone into bankruptcy by 2003 was half that of non-ITQ fisheries. On this basis, it would 
seem that the alternative policy is better for both fish and fishermen.  
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Appendix Tables (only online version) 
 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Total Sample  Mean 
Sample 
Variance Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Production value (Millions of Yen) 932176.11 124.57 368548.18 20.80 0.01 25894.30 607.08 
# of Management entities 74722 9.99 245.96 5.00 1.00 358.00 15.68 
Fishing days (average) - 164.06 4179.12 158.00 1.00 365.00 64.65 
# of Fishermen 169800 22.69 2213.11 11.00 1.00 1894.05 47.04 
Powered vessels        
Number 77395 10.47 256.93 5.00 1.00 365.00 16.03 
Tonnage (GRT) 722019.38 97.94 347865.53 23.95 0.10 30511.00 589.80 
Horsepower (kilowatt) 5037164.95 675.45 2055318.90 255.99 2.20 39599.50 1433.64 
Production quantity 
(Thousands of metric tons) – Total 4018.17 0.55 8569.14 0.05 0.00 110.50 2.93 
Japanese sardine 48.59 0.01 10.58 0.00 0.00 3.96 0.10 
Japanese jack mackerel 217.40 0.03 126.11 0.00 0.00 12.85 0.36 
Mackerel 296.02 0.04 287.34 0.00 0.00 20.10 0.54 
Pacific saury 264.66 0.04 582.53 0.00 0.00 40.58 0.76 
Alaska Pollock 212.60 0.03 162.27 0.00 0.00 24.63 0.40 
Queen crab 5.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.01 
Japanese Common Squid 250.93 0.03 113.69 0.00 0.00 20.42 0.34 
TAC (a total of above 7 species) 1295.36 0.17 1992.74 0.01 0.00 40.58 1.41 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan, 2005a, “the 11th Fishery Census of Japan of 2003”. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries of Japan, 2003, “Annual Statistics of Fishery and Fish Culture 2003” 
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Table A2. Catch value and number of DMU classified by the fishery type and sea area 
  Fishery type         Total 
Area  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Hokkaido Pacific 
Ocean, North 
# of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
40 - - 1 66 13 91 - 38 45 294 
504 - - 1 1199 102 637 - 259 234 2936 
23.8 - - 1.5 21.1 12.1 26.5 - 6.5 7.7 99.2 
Pacific Ocean, 
North 
# of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
67 49 - 11 119 33 105 - 58 111 553 
494 429 - 29 1500 80 447 - 269 1003 4251 
20.4 5.8 - 21.3 5.9 6.3 17.9 - 58.5 19.2 155.2 
Pacific Ocean, 
Middle 
# of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
91 67 8 35 214 17 138 26 72 325 993 
1312 607 31 67 2806 43 458 184 382 3707 9597 
14.6 17.6 0.1 44.0 9.6 3.0 11.2 0.7 37.4 27.4 165.5 
Pacific Ocean, 
South 
# of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
52 48 1 52 130 18 105 16 139 310 871 
383 205 1 209 1398 120 322 79 850 4977 8544 
4.5 3.6 0.2 14.6 2.6 0.5 5.6 0.2 35.7 29.1 96.6 
Hokkaido Japan 
Sea, North 
# of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
32 - - 1 49 11 73 2 23 45 236 
204 - - 2 700 44 561 2 172 395 2080 
42.6 - - 0.0 7.9 0.3 11.2 0.1 7.6 6.8 76.6 
Japan Sea, North # of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
62 17 3 1 121 7 96 - 39 115 461 
329 37 4 1 1850 19 697 - 127 890 3954 
5.9 0.3 0.0 1.9 4.5 1.0 11.4 - 5.2 4.7 34.8 
Japan Sea, West # of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
92 32 5 17 110 6 124 2 37 225 650 
640 88 11 31 1670 20 462 18 256 2770 5966 
26.7 0.3 0.1 14.7 4.6 0.2 12.3 0.1 1.1 13.3 73.5 
East China Sea # of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
135 115 4 69 384 57 271 38 199 716 1988 
1340 669 14 178 4294 265 812 103 1468 11686 20829 
9.9 7.5 0.1 41.4 13.3 2.6 9.8 0.6 26.7 33.7 145.7 
Seto Inland Sea # of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
327 160 3 17 353 14 142 12 102 307 1437 
5245 726 6 29 4021 57 612 46 470 5358 16570 
32.3 23.7 0.0 4.3 10.6 0.7 2.8 0.3 2.3 8.2 85.1 
All areas # of DMUs 
# of entities 
Production Value 
898 488 24 204 1546 176 1145 96 707 2199 7483 
10451 2761 67 547 19438 750 5008 432 4253 31020 74727 
180.8 58.7 0.4 143.7 80.0 26.7 108.6 2.0 180.9 150.2 932.2 
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*Production value (unit: Billions of Yen) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan, 2005a, “the 11th Fishery Census of Japan of 2003” 
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Table A3. Catch value and quantity classified by fishery type 
 
 
Sample 
Data 
Statistical 
Data           
Fishery 
type 2 
Production 
value 
(Billions 
of Yen) 
Production 
value 
 
Total 
production 
quantity 
         
    Fish 
Other 
marine 
animal 
Japanese 
sardine 
Japanese 
jack 
mackerel 
Mackerel Pacific 
saury 
Alaska 
Pollock 
Queen 
crab 
Japanese 
Common 
Squid 
1 7.5 16.8 140.3 59.1 81.1 - - - - 5.9 - - 
2 1.9 2.5 8.5 6.8 1.7 - 0.4 - - - - 0.0 
3 50.8 46.7 364.2 314.1 50.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 - 134.8 4.0 32.3 
4 11.7 9.9 26.5 20.9 5.6 - 0.5 - - 3.5 - 3.1 
5 29.1 25.3 45.8 34.6 11.2 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.5 
6 79.6 88.4 451.3 41.5 409.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 - 0.2 0.0 0.2 
7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 - - - - - - - 
8 51.0 46.8 223.1 170.7 52.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 - - - 0.0 
9 7.7 8.3 20.2 19.4 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10 0.4 0.5 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 - - - 0.0 
11 37.0 25.6 157.8 157.8 0.0 - - - - - - - 
12 7.0 15.7 64.5 64.5 0.0 - - - - - - - 
13 52.7 54.8 611.1 596.8 14.3 36.2 117.6 183.9 0.0 - - 14.3 
14 3.1 2.2 56.6 56.4 0.1 1.8 0.0 1.1 - - - 0.1 
15 32.7 42.6 317.5 316.3 1.3 6.0 73.4 80.7 0.2 - - 0.7 
16 8.3 8.7 83.5 83.4 0.1 2.2 8.3 4.6 0.0 - - 0.0 
17 2.8 3.1 23.6 23.5 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.7 - - - 0.0 
18 2.5 6.5 9.4 9.4 0.0 - - - - - - - 
19 2.3 2.3 6.4 6.4 0.0 - - - - - - - 
20 75.1 71.9 183.8 167.5 16.3 0.1 1.3 0.6 3.1 45.5 0.2 5.8 
21 21.1 16.5 255.5 255.5 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 255.5 - - - 
22 5.6 9.3 48.5 46.5 2.0 0.6 2.0 13.0 0.1 - - 0.1 
23 50.7 47.5 236.5 196.8 39.8 2.6 22.2 31.6 5.5 7.6 - 33.4 
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24 29.3 33.0 215.6 213.9 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 - 1.6 
25 28.7 33.9 152.8 137.1 15.6 1.2 8.2 2.2 0.3 7.0 - 7.7 
26 2.0 2.4 11.8 10.9 0.8 0.2 0.0 5.4 - - - - 
27 127.0 89.8 136.1 136.1 0.0 - - - - - - - 
28 23.8 27.0 56.9 56.9 0.0 - - - - - - - 
29 5.1 5.6 9.8 9.8 0.0 - - - - - - - 
30 25.0 20.8 44.0 35.2 8.8 - 0.1 0.0 - 13.7 - 0.0 
31 21.0 20.3 97.5 97.5 0.0 - - - - - - - 
32 14.0 14.9 57.9 57.9 0.0 - - - - - - - 
33 3.2 4.2 10.9 10.9 0.0 - - - - - - - 
34 8.2 10.4 60.4 0.0 60.4 - - - - - - 1.3 
35 13.4 13.5 70.8 0.0 70.8 - - - - - - 56.7 
36 40.4 39.3 114.8 0.0 114.8 - - - - - - 96.2 
37 0.8 1.0 2.9 2.9 0.0 - 0.0 2.5 - - - - 
38 10.3 13.8 30.6 30.5 0.1 - 0.0 0.1 - - - - 
39 38.9 33.4 48.1 46.1 2.0 0.0 4.3 2.2 0.0 0.1 - 0.0 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan, 2005b, “Annual Statistics of Fishery and Fish Culture 2003” 
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Table A4. Production classified by area  
 
 
Hokkaido 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
North 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
North 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
Middle 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
South 
Hokkaido 
Japan Sea, 
North 
Japan 
Sea, 
North 
Japan 
Sea, 
West 
East 
China Sea 
Seto 
Inland 
Sea 
Production value 
(Billions of Yen) 99.2 155.2 165.5 96.6 76.6 34.8 73.5 145.7 85.1 
Production quantity 
(Thousands of metric tons)          
Total 559.7 629.7 680.4 349.2 370.5 118.6 398.0 659.9 314.8 
Japanese sardine 0.2 7.9 6.3 6.1 0.2 0.5 7.7 18.3 1.3 
Japanese jack mackerel 2.1 29.4 24.7 29.9 1.6 4.6 35.1 84.2 5.8 
Mackerel 2.1 43.7 32.2 41.5 0.9 5.0 49.0 116.6 5.0 
Pacific saury 147.5 74.9 23.1 0.8 3.0 12.4 1.3 1.2 0.5 
Alaska Pollock 46.8 34.8 12.9 4.5 37.2 7.8 47.8 14.7 8.7 
Queen crab 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.2 1.5 0.1 0.4 
Japanese Common Squid 25.7 65.2 10.8 6.1 19.9 15.5 56.0 49.8 1.9 
TAC (a total of above 7 
species) 225.6 256.7 110.2 89.0 63.7 46.1 198.4 284.8 23.6 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan, 2005b, “Annual Statistics of 
Fishery and Fish Culture 2003” 
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Table A5. Aggregated Vessel Excess Capacity (%) (1, 2 and 3 outputs; Fishery type 1 and 2) 
 
 Areas         Total 
 Hokkaido 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
North 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
North 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
Middle 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
South 
Hokkaido 
Japan Sea, 
North 
Japan 
Sea, 
North 
Japan 
Sea, 
West 
East 
China 
Sea 
Seto 
Inland  
Sea 
 
1 output           
Production value; Fishery type 1 187.4% 96.4% 197.5% 169.9% 244.5% 98.9% 148.4% 478.4% 1419.0% 328.43% 
Production value; Fishery type 2 133.6% 58.1% 151.0% 60.7% 151.9% 71.7% 95.0% 195.3% 387.3% 145.50% 
Production quantity; Fishery type 1 170.3% 104.9% 185.6% 194.2% 270.0% 125.9% 161.1% 412.5% 658.5% 248.49% 
Production quantity; Fishery type 2 111.3% 53.2% 108.2% 53.9% 157.7% 66.5% 80.1% 145.9% 241.8% 112.42% 
2 outputs; Fishery type 1           
Japanese sardine 140.5% 32.4% 135.3% 73.7% 139.9% 109.2% 121.5% 121.1% 102.2% 102.11% 
Japanese jack mackerel 152.9% 64.2% 197.6% 104.9% 158.0% 99.7% 152.0% 170.5% 257.7% 147.78% 
Mackerel 114.1% 40.1% 178.1% 115.9% 197.7% 66.5% 144.1% 149.3% 105.6% 128.54% 
Pacific saury 13.2% 79.4% 61.7% 95.8% 24.1% 6.5% 201.7% 317.9% 261.4% 38.99% 
Alaska Pollock 62.0% 75.7% 689.0% 111.7% 51.7% 104.3% 55.7% 263.3% 342.3% 126.38% 
Queen crab 29.4% 69.2% 348.7% 104.0% 33.1% 114.4% 65.4% 153.6% 1530.7% 187.84% 
Japanese Common Squid 59.2% 56.8% 315.1% 117.4% 72.9% 113.7% 115.3% 672.0% 414.9% 212.27% 
TAC (a total of above 7 species) 31.5% 62.2% 238.7% 117.1% 62.7% 73.7% 113.5% 254.6% 279.1% 130.02% 
Other marine animals (non-TAC 
species) 191.4% 85.9% 136.9% 160.8% 196.0% 97.9% 144.2% 254.6% 626.2% 211.91% 
2 outputs; Fishery type 2           
TAC (a total of above 7 species) 26.1% 53.4% 174.1% 51.9% 53.2% 57.6% 78.5% 183.3% 254.8% 94.93% 
Other marine animals (non-TAC 
species) 168.7% 53.0% 95.4% 54.6% 179.4% 72.1% 81.7% 117.4% 240.7% 120.56% 
3 outputs; Fishery type 1           
Japanese sardine 137.5% 31.0% 133.5% 71.8% 139.0% 102.4% 120.1% 118.6% 94.5% 99.97% 
Japanese jack mackerel 151.5% 61.5% 195.4% 104.1% 155.9% 94.2% 150.9% 168.7% 219.0% 144.98% 
Mackerel 84.9% 39.6% 176.0% 111.6% 111.9% 65.2% 141.7% 144.8% 90.6% 124.74% 
Pacific saury 13.1% 79.4% 61.6% 95.3% 19.8% 6.5% 201.0% 314.8% 260.9% 38.86% 
Alaska Pollock 60.8% 74.0% 688.4% 110.5% 50.0% 104.1% 54.9% 262.7% 338.5% 125.10% 
Queen crab 29.3% 69.1% 348.3% 103.9% 33.1% 113.9% 64.9% 153.5% 1529.3% 187.52% 
Japanese Common Squid 55.7% 51.9% 300.2% 103.4% 68.4% 107.8% 111.2% 658.7% 390.5% 205.19% 
TAC (a total of above 7 species) 29.7% 59.8% 194.0% 73.5% 57.2% 71.0% 88.5% 198.1% 266.1% 105.65% 
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Other fishes (non-TAC species) 122.5% 77.8% 125.7% 142.8% 170.3% 85.5% 104.9% 169.5% 306.7% 141.45% 
Other marine animals (non-TAC 
species) 363.7% 72.1% 100.3% 119.5% 198.6% 104.6% 100.5% 312.1% 350.5% 222.88% 
3 outputs; Fishery type 2           
TAC (a total of above 7 species) 26.1% 52.8% 174.0% 51.8% 53.2% 57.6% 78.4% 182.3% 254.8% 94.57% 
Other fishes (non-TAC species) 110.9% 52.4% 95.6% 52.8% 162.9% 72.2% 82.2% 100.9% 285.8% 104.67% 
Other marine animals (non-TAC 
species) 351.4% 56.1% 94.2% 83.8% 192.6% 71.2% 77.4% 276.5% 175.9% 178.03% 
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Table A6. Industry Model Scenarios: Efficiency measure and activity vectors (total and per area) 
 
  All areas          
   Hokkaido 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
North 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
North 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
Middle 
Pacific 
Ocean, 
South 
Hokkaido 
Japan Sea, 
North 
Japan 
Sea, 
North 
Japan 
Sea, 
West 
East 
China  
Sea 
Seto 
Inland 
Sea 
Actual # of 
DMUs 
(# of 
entities) 
7483 
(74727) 
294 
(2936) 
553 
(4251) 
993 
(9597) 
871 
(8544) 
236 
(2080) 
461 
(3954) 
650 
(5966) 
1988 
(20829) 
1437 
(18764) 
1 output; Production value   # of DMUs  
(Mean jaw (>0)) 
         
Basic scenario 1 (10 
fishing types) 0.102  1741 (0.997) 95 260 289 413 22 219 149 268 26 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×10) 0.156  2110 (0.998) 113 282 296 401 34 220 188 491 85 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×5) 0.210  2562 (0.0.998) 139 345 445 390 30 230 210 583 190 
Basic scenario 2 (39 
fishing types) 0.169  2429 (0.998) 96 365 300 586 20 277 270 487 28 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×10) 0.239  3015 (0.998) 130 370 453 534 24 270 254 799 181 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×5) 0.292  3092 (0.999) 135 367 475 540 27 266 224 787 271 
1 output; Production quantity            
Basic scenario 1 (10 
fishing types) 0.072  1289 (0.997) 95 193 224 160 22 122 98 302 73 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×10) 0.096  1167 (0.995) 101 209 167 169 34 121 83 163 120 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×5) 0.125  1304 (0.997) 102 250 160 173 26 123 100 185 185 
Basic scenario 2 (39 
fishing types) 0.130  1755 (0.997) 92 250 316 363 19 164 130 314 107 
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Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×10) 0.170  1979 (0.997) 98 252 327 333 21 174 130 388 256 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×5) 0.197  2102 (0.998) 95 263 364 302 24 165 120 376 393 
2 outputs; TAC and others            
Basic scenario 1 (10 
fishing types) 0.109  1699 (0.997) 93 240 258 313 61 154 106 346 128 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×10) 0.135  1808 (0.996) 96 257 246 281 62 145 100 268 353 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×5) 0.168  1940 (0.996) 99 272 295 281 63 148 99 292 391 
Basic scenario 2 (39 
fishing types) 0.169  2268 (0.997) 99 314 351 378 56 164 136 667 103 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×10) 0.205  2377 (0.996) 104 310 390 324 62 157 119 563 348 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×5) 0.231  2471 (0.997) 108 306 375 328 60 164 119 576 435 
2 outputs; each species and 
others 
           
Japanese sardine 0.086  1277 (0.996) 106 192 255 232 44 122 106 108 112 
Japanese jack mackerel 0.088  1447 (0.995) 106 193 266 255 40 117 120 282 68 
Mackerel 0.089  1389 (0.995) 104 186 269 267 34 123 118 197 91 
Pacific saury 0.093  1739 (0.996) 91 187 258 268 67 113 122 377 256 
Alaska Pollock 0.099  1827 (0.996) 106 218 220 308 20 163 119 472 201 
Queen crab 0.084  1452 (0.996) 89 201 234 256 19 126 114 344 69 
Japanese Common Squid 0.099  1455 (0.994) 120 218 232 199 63 133 185 210 95 
3 outputs; TAC, other fish 
and other marine animals 
           
Basic scenario 1 (10 
fishing types) 0.145  2282 (0.994) 96 258 354 373 54 165 261 550 171 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×10) 0.177  2319 (0.994) 98 266 315 325 55 166 240 455 399 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×5) 0.204  2301 (0.995) 98 274 312 309 54 163 219 438 434 
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Basic scenario 2 (39 
fishing types) 0.190  2594 (0.996) 105 302 378 380 66 212 284 636 231 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×10) 0.222  2735 (0.996) 105 290 383 324 63 217 267 579 507 
Technical inefficiency (up 
to ×5) 0.246  2692 (0.995) 109 296 371 316 62 213 242 575 508 
3 outputs; each species, other 
fish and other marine 
animals 
           
Japanese sardine 0.109  1627 (0.992) 102 239 356 259 59 134 215 114 149 
Japanese jack mackerel 0.110  1758 (0.991) 105 230 359 279 58 134 215 259 119 
Mackerel 0.112  1762 (0.994) 104 219 358 308 47 142 217 219 148 
Pacific saury 0.118  1993 (0.993) 96 235 358 290 68 133 208 284 321 
Alaska Pollock 0.117  2093 (0.994) 116 255 349 336 23 160 221 406 227 
Queen crab 0.108  1693 (0.993) 92 238 342 254 24 141 233 242 127 
Japanese Common Squid 0.139  2109 (0.994) 117 258 359 330 64 156 263 441 121 
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Table A7. Optimum Input Allocations for Each Scenario 
 
 Tonnage 
  
Horsepower 
  
Fishing days 
(average) 
2
, ,1 ,1j j v vw x X
   
( 0)jw   
Labor 
, ,2 ,2j j v vw x X
   
Overall 
average w 
Current situation (100%) 732906.4 5054382.0 164.1 169800  
1 output; Production value      
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 10.21% 10.21% 113.32% 35.69% 0.232  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 15.57% 15.57% 119.43% 41.62% 0.281  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 20.96% 20.96% 120.45% 48.59% 0.342  
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 16.93% 16.93% 112.72% 43.81% 0.324  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 23.93% 23.93% 114.81% 53.83% 0.402  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 29.21% 29.21% 116.50% 58.45% 0.413  
1 output; production quantity      
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 7.21% 7.21% 114.74% 29.03% 0.234  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 9.62% 9.62% 125.27% 24.59% 0.155  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 12.55% 12.55% 126.58% 27.91% 0.174  
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 12.99% 12.99% 112.99% 35.36% 0.234  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 17.00% 17.00% 118.77% 38.66% 0.264  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 19.74% 19.74% 120.67% 41.65% 0.280  
2 outputs; TAC and other species      
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 10.90% 10.90% 120.79% 34.03% 0.226  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 13.50% 13.50% 122.75% 35.50% 0.241  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 16.84% 16.84% 125.13% 39.42% 0.258  
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 16.89% 16.89% 116.15% 40.67% 0.302  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 20.47% 20.47% 119.99% 44.49% 0.316  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 23.07% 23.07% 121.37% 47.53% 0.329  
2 outputs; each species and other species      
Japanese sardine 8.60% 8.60% 116.60% 25.31% 0.170  
Japanese jack mackerel 8.77% 8.77% 120.50% 28.51% 0.192  
Mackerel 8.87% 8.87% 120.33% 26.88% 0.185  
Pacific saury 9.29% 9.29% 119.63% 35.33% 0.231  
Alaska Pollock 9.85% 9.85% 114.48% 34.05% 0.243  
Queen crab 8.42% 8.42% 114.85% 30.57% 0.193  
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Japanese Common Squid 9.87% 9.87% 121.81% 26.83% 0.193  
3 outputs; TAC, other fish and other marine animals      
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 14.46% 14.46% 119.21% 40.58% 0.303  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 17.72% 17.72% 122.18% 42.32% 0.308  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 20.39% 20.39% 123.67% 44.31% 0.306  
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 18.99% 18.99% 117.02% 30.78% 0.345  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 22.19% 22.19% 120.07% 47.77% 0.364  
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 24.56% 24.56% 121.13% 50.06% 0.358  
3 outputs;  
each species, other fish and other marine animals      
Japanese sardine 10.94% 10.94% 115.21% 30.78% 0.216  
Japanese jack mackerel 10.96% 10.96% 120.71% 32.77% 0.233  
Mackerel 11.21% 11.21% 119.08% 31.68% 0.234  
Pacific saury 11.84% 11.84% 122.19% 36.47% 0.264  
Alaska Pollock 11.72% 11.72% 115.88% 36.04% 0.278  
Queen crab 10.78% 10.78% 115.64% 30.44% 0.225  
Japanese Common Squid 13.88% 13.88% 119.35% 37.92% 0.280  
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Table A8. Optimum Amounts of Inputs (Tonnage; per each fishery type) 
 
  Fishing type 1         
 Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Current situation (Tonnage) 732906.4 106404.2 40993.8 166.7 79446.5 65629.1 17062.5 38003.0 1903.9 216612.6 166684.1 
1 output; Production value            
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 10.21% 9.13% 1.64% 13.17% 14.44% 5.30% 11.21% 51.38% 0.17% 8.79% 5.38% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 15.57% 16.28% 3.48% 16.87% 32.16% 6.75% 13.06% 68.02% 0.99% 11.69% 7.15% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 20.96% 23.73% 13.58% 25.33% 44.65% 11.60% 14.42% 69.43% 1.55% 15.28% 10.64% 
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 16.93% 17.04% 8.11% 18.85% 18.62% 12.67% 17.21% 52.17% 1.29% 16.69% 12.32% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 23.93% 25.00% 20.28% 26.77% 41.40% 18.83% 16.53% 64.85% 5.00% 19.76% 14.88% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 29.21% 30.22% 39.10% 25.33% 51.61% 21.02% 22.19% 66.73% 10.80% 23.40% 18.60% 
1 output; Production quantity            
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 7.21% 7.27% 0.48% 0.00% 27.82% 1.44% 23.54% 43.30% 0.17% 0.00% 0.85% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 9.62% 14.55% 0.95% 11.73% 35.88% 0.48% 24.30% 54.30% 0.32% 0.00% 0.60% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 12.55% 16.53% 10.60% 11.73% 50.55% 0.50% 31.22% 60.10% 1.96% 0.04% 0.74% 
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 12.99% 13.90% 7.19% 13.17% 49.01% 5.84% 32.79% 51.70% 2.37% 0.65% 4.77% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 17.00% 16.26% 25.24% 11.73% 66.27% 6.00% 44.84% 62.82% 9.38% 0.78% 4.18% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 19.74% 21.98% 35.28% 17.36% 70.72% 6.01% 58.89% 69.93% 11.44% 0.80% 4.86% 
2 outputs; TAC and other species            
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 10.90% 18.76% 3.45% 13.17% 27.11% 2.27% 46.08% 49.33% 7.21% 0.03% 5.17% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 13.50% 21.70% 5.59% 11.73% 38.61% 3.42% 46.68% 62.10% 9.93% 0.35% 4.87% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 16.84% 27.96% 17.70% 11.73% 47.89% 5.09% 44.03% 68.58% 10.11% 0.98% 5.48% 
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 16.89% 24.71% 15.02% 13.17% 50.70% 8.31% 38.66% 59.37% 3.12% 1.19% 8.26% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 20.47% 28.58% 37.42% 11.73% 63.32% 9.01% 38.80% 69.21% 10.76% 1.39% 7.15% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 23.07% 33.05% 50.56% 13.47% 68.62% 8.55% 39.68% 72.79% 11.01% 1.70% 8.84% 
2 outputs; each species and other species            
Japanese sardine 8.60% 6.96% 0.80% 1.21% 38.48% 1.86% 22.17% 47.56% 1.33% 0.00% 0.96% 
Japanese jack mackerel  8.77% 9.39% 1.83% 0.00% 30.02% 2.22% 24.29% 52.94% 0.65% 0.00% 2.36% 
Mackerel  8.87% 7.53% 1.62% 13.17% 33.73% 2.23% 21.75% 52.92% 10.08% 0.00% 2.43% 
Pacific saury  9.29% 9.53% 1.58% 11.73% 27.13% 5.86% 42.32% 52.15% 0.65% 0.00% 2.89% 
Alaska Pollock  9.85% 23.73% 1.05% 0.84% 22.83% 5.67% 23.71% 49.36% 0.65% 0.20% 0.84% 
Queen crab  8.42% 21.09% 0.68% 0.00% 20.94% 1.58% 23.59% 39.18% 0.65% 0.00% 1.42% 
Japanese Common Squid  9.87% 10.08% 0.64% 9.68% 25.11% 1.74% 21.57% 49.94% 0.65% 0.00% 10.53% 
3 outputs; TAC, other fish and other marine 
animals            
Basic scenario 1 (10 fishing types) 14.46% 28.75% 6.27% 11.73% 34.57% 3.80% 43.75% 58.85% 7.77% 0.03% 7.67% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 17.72% 34.34% 13.92% 11.73% 46.38% 4.63% 44.02% 64.02% 10.24% 0.51% 8.75% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 20.39% 38.92% 25.63% 11.73% 51.75% 5.39% 43.77% 68.14% 10.11% 1.11% 10.16% 
Basic scenario 2 (39 fishing types) 18.99% 35.59% 14.80% 13.17% 49.33% 8.48% 35.62% 62.53% 4.91% 1.43% 10.44% 
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Technical inefficiency (up to ×10) 22.19% 42.45% 27.26% 11.73% 60.96% 9.32% 34.92% 68.03% 12.61% 1.47% 9.86% 
Technical inefficiency (up to ×5) 24.56% 45.21% 39.75% 13.47% 64.93% 9.19% 38.82% 71.18% 12.70% 1.91% 11.93% 
3 outputs; Each species, other fish and other 
marine animals            
Japanese sardine 10.94% 13.04% 2.42% 0.00% 33.42% 2.45% 28.80% 60.04% 1.33% 0.00% 5.63% 
Japanese jack mackerel  10.96% 13.37% 2.56% 0.00% 24.86% 2.70% 41.20% 64.48% 0.91% 0.00% 7.17% 
Mackerel  11.21% 13.69% 2.57% 11.73% 27.99% 2.67% 37.64% 62.60% 10.18% 0.00% 7.27% 
Pacific saury  11.84% 14.72% 3.32% 9.68% 29.35% 6.89% 40.73% 63.81% 0.91% 0.00% 6.40% 
Alaska Pollock  11.72% 28.48% 3.35% 9.68% 19.42% 6.21% 25.63% 59.97% 0.65% 0.21% 4.25% 
Queen crab  10.78% 28.53% 2.42% 0.00% 16.22% 2.26% 28.58% 56.47% 0.65% 0.00% 4.17% 
Japanese Common Squid  13.88% 24.75% 2.52% 11.73% 30.43% 3.50% 28.56% 60.37% 0.99% 0.00% 12.04% 
 
 
 
